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Abstract
A multi-player Dynkin game is a sequential game in which at every
stage one of the players is chosen, and that player can decide whether
to continue the game or to stop it, in which case all players receive
some terminal payoﬀ.
We study a variant of this model, where the order by which players
are chosen is deterministic, and the probability that the game termi-
nates once the chosen player decides to stop may be strictly less than
1.
We prove that a subgame-perfect -equilibrium in Markovian strate-
gies exists. If the game is not degenerate, this -equilibrium is actu-
ally in pure strategies, but in degenerate cases there need not exist a
subgame-perfect -equilibrium in pure strategies
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11 Introduction
Dynkin (1969) introduced the following zero-sum game of optimal stopping.
The game involves two players, and two stochastic processes: (in)n∈N is a
{1,2}-valued process, which indicates which player is active at stage n, and
(rn)n∈N is a R2-valued process, which indicates the terminal payoﬀ.
At every stage n, the two players are informed of past and current values
of the two processes. Player in, the active player at stage n, decides whether
he continues or stops. The game stops at the ﬁrst stage θ in which the active
player chooses to stop. The payoﬀ (paid by player 2 to player 1) is rθ if
θ < +∞ and zero otherwise. A pure strategy of player i is a stopping time
that is consistent with the rules of the game.
Dynkin proved that this game has a value if supn∈N |rn| ∈ L1, and con-
structed pure -optimal strategies for the two players. Dynkin’s -optimal
strategies are subgame-perfect in the sense that after every ﬁnite history, the
continuation strategy is -optimal in the subgame deﬁned by that history.
An extensive literature developed from this seminal work. In a discrete
time framework, much attention was paid to the case where the players are
allowed to stop simultaneously. In the zero-sum case, several authors, in-
cluding Kiefer (1971) and Neveu (1975), provided suﬃcient conditions for
the existence of the value, when players are restricted to stopping times.
Rosenberg et al. (2001) proved (under a minimal boundedness condition)
that the value always exists, provided the players are allowed to use random-
ized stopping times. In the two-player non-zero-sum case, Shmaya and Solan
(2002) proved that an ε-equilibrium always exists in randomized stopping
times (again, under some boundedness condition).
In the present paper we consider a diﬀerent generalization of Dynkin’s
model to a multi-player setup. Speciﬁcally, we analyze the following class
of I-player games. A deterministic sequence (in,pn,rn) ∈ I × [0,1] × RI is
given. At each stage n player in chooses whether to continue or to stop. If
he continues, the game continues to the next stage, while if he stops a lottery
is performed. With probability pn the game terminates, yielding the payoﬀ
rn, while with probability 1 − pn the game continues.
This model is more restrictive than the natural generalization of Dynkin’s
model, in that the order in which players alternate is deterministic. On the
other hand, it incorporates an additional degree of generality, since a player
may not be able to stop the process for sure at a given stage.
Our model can be used to analyze situations of shrinking markets (see,
2e.g., Ghemawat and Nalebuﬀ (1985), Fine and Li (1989)), in which n ﬁrms
have to decide when to exit a shrinking market. Since once a ﬁrm exits, we
remain with a market with n − 1 ﬁrms, which can be solved inductively, we
are reduced to a Dynkin game.
A similar situation occurs in takeover games, where n ﬁrms strategically
decide to make a takeover attempt on opponent ﬁrms. Since a takeover at-
tempt is not always successful, the probability of termination upon stopping
(=making a takeover attempt) may be strictly smaller than 1.
In both of these models, the assumption that the order of players is
deterministic can be explained by having diﬀerent days of the week for board
meetings of the various ﬁrms.
Another model which is close to the one we study is multi-player duels,
or n-uels (see, e.g., Kilgour (1975, 1977) or Kilgour and Brams (1997)).
In this model, n gunners alternately have the option to shoot one of their
opponents or abstain. Since once a gunner hits one of his opponents we are
left with a game with n−1 players, which can be solved inductively, the game
is essentially reduced to a deterministic Dynkin game where players have
several stop actions. As the accuracy of the gunners may not be perfect, the
probability of termination upon stopping (=shooting) may be strictly less
than 1.
Our main result states that if the sequence (rn) of payoﬀs is bounded, a
subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in Markovian strategies exists. Moreover, un-
less the game is degenerate, this ε-equilibrium is in pure strategies. However,
in degenerate cases, a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium need not exist. Since
the subgame-perfect -equilibrium we identify is in Markovian strategies, it
is robust to the information players receive along the game; all they need to
know is the stage of the game. Translated to the n-uel model, this means
that there is a subgame-perfect -equilibrium which is also a subgame-perfect
-equilibrium in the silent n-uel, in which players do not observe missed shots.
A multi-player Dynkin game is a game of perfect information. Hence,
for every ε > 0, by Mertens’ (1987) generalization of Martin’s (1975) result,
there is a Nash ε-equilibrium. However, this ε-equilibrium may involve non-
credible threats of punishment.
The paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and
the main result. Several examples appear in Section 3. The proof of the
main result appears in Section 4. The paper concludes in Section 5 with a
discussion and open problems.
32 The Model and the Main Result
2.1 Multi-player deterministic Dynkin games
A deterministic multi-player Dynkin game Γ = (I,(in,pn,rn)n∈N) is given by
• A ﬁnite set I of players.
• For every n ∈ N, a triplet (in,pn,rn) ∈ I × [0,1] × RI.
The triplet (in,pn,rn) speciﬁes who is allowed to stop at stage n, the proba-
bility of success in that case, and the corresponding payoﬀ respectively.
The game is played in stages. At each stage n ∈ N, provided the game has
not terminated yet, player in has to choose whether to continue or stop. If he
decides to continue, the game continues to stage n+1. If he decides to stop,
a lottery takes place (all lotteries in the game, including random choices by
the players, are independent). With probability pn the game terminates, and
the terminal payoﬀ for the players is given by the vector rn. With probability
1 − pn the game continues to stage n + 1. If the game never terminates, the
payoﬀ is zero for each player.
We denote by θ the termination stage of the game, i.e., the ﬁrst stage in
which a player decides to stop, and the game terminates. Thus, the payoﬀ
to player i ∈ I is ri
θ1θ<∞.
2.2 Strategies and results
A strategy of player i ∈ I maps the set of information sets of player i to the
set of mixed moves of player i. We let Ni = {n ∈ N | in = i} be the set of
stages in which player i is active.
We are going to restrict the players to Markovian strategies; namely,
strategies that depend only on the stage, and not on the history. We will
prove below that the game admits a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in Marko-
vian strategies. By a general observation (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991, p.501)), this subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium remains a subgame-perfect
ε-equilibrium without the restriction to Markovian strategies.
In the present context, a (behavior Markovian) strategy of player i is a
function σi : Ni → [0,1], where σi(n) is the probability assigned by player i
to stop at stage n, provided the game does not terminate before that stage.
We denote the set of strategies of player i by Σi.
4A strategy proﬁle (or simply a proﬁle) is a vector σ = (σi)i∈I of strategies,
one for each player.
Every strategy proﬁle σ ∈ ×i∈IΣi induces a probability distribution Pσ
over the space of plays, or inﬁnite histories. The corresponding expectation






Before we state our result, we ﬁrst recall standard equilibrium notions.
Deﬁnition 1 Let ε ≥ 0. A strategy proﬁle σ is an ε-equilibrium if for every






We mention that, for any ε0 > ε, an ε-equilibrium is a uniform ε0-equilibrium;
that is, it is a ε0-equilibrium (a) in every discounted game, provided the
discount factor is suﬃciently small, and (b) in every N-stage game, provided
N is suﬃciently large. Indeed, the proof provided in Solan and Vieille (2001,
Proposition 2.13) does adapt to the present framework.
For n ∈ N, we denote by
γn(σ) = Eσ[rθ1θ<∞ | θ ≥ n]
the conditional expected payoﬀ, given that termination does not occur prior
to stage n. Equivalently, γn(σ) is the payoﬀ induced by the strategy proﬁle
σ in the subgame starting at stage n.
A strategy proﬁle is a subgame-perfect (ε-)equilibrium of a game if it
induces an (ε-)equilibrium in any subgame. In the present context, this
amounts to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2 Let ε ≥ 0. A strategy proﬁle σ is a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium








Our main result is the following.
Theorem 3 Let Γ = (I,(in,pn,rn)n∈N) be a deterministic Dynkin game. If
the sequence (rn)n∈N is bounded, then for every ε > 0, the game Γ admits a
subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in Markovian strategies.
5We conclude this section with two comments.
As will be clear from the proof, in most cases, there is a pure subgame-
perfect equilibrium. However, this is not always true (see Example 3 below).
This is in sharp contrast with ﬁnite extensive games of perfect information
and with two-player zero-sum Dynkin games.
Our proof is valid as long as γ(σ) is uniformly bounded, for every proﬁle
σ (which is the case when the sequence (rn)n∈N is bounded.) If this does not
hold, the payoﬀ function of the game is not well-deﬁned.
3 Examples
In the present section we provide several examples, that illustrate the main
features of the model.





(1,1,(1,0,3)) n = 1 modulo 3,
(2,1,(3,1,0)) n = 2 modulo 3,
(3,1,(0,3,1)) n = 0 modulo 3.
In words, at the ﬁrst stage, player 1 can stop the game, thereby yielding
the payoﬀ vector (1,0,3). If player 1 chooses to continue, at the second
stage player 2 can stop the game, yielding the terminal payoﬀ (3,1,0). If
player 2 chooses to continue as well, at the third stage player 3 can stop the
game, yielding the terminal payoﬀ (0,3,1). The process then repeats itself
cyclically. This game is a variation upon a game studied by Flesch et al.
(1997).
We will characterize all pure subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium proﬁles of
that game, using backward induction.
Let σ be such a 0-equilibrium. Assume that at stage 3n, for some n ≥ 2,
player 3 stops with probability 1; that is, σ3(3n) = 1. In particular, γ3n(σ) =
(0,3,1).
Consider the subgame starting at stage 3n − 1. In that subgame, player
2 receives γ2
3n(σ) = 3 if he chooses to continue at stage 3n − 1, while he
receives only 1 if he chooses to stop. By the subgame-perfect equilibrium
condition, player 2 continues at stage 3n−1, that is, σ2(3n−1) = 0. Hence
γ3n−1(σ) = γ3n(σ) = (0,3,1).
6We repeat this argument with the subgame starting at stage 3n − 2. By
continuing at stage 3n − 2 player 1 receives 0, as the game will be termi-
nated at stage 3n, while by stopping he receives 1. By the subgame-perfect
equilibrium condition, σ1(3n − 2) = 1 and γ3n−2(σ) = (1,0,3).
Applying this backward induction argument repeatedly, we get that σ3(3n−
3) = 0, σ2(3n − 4) = 1, σ1(3n − 5) = 0 and σ3(3n − 6) = 1. The cycle of
length 6 then repeats itself.
On the other hand, if σ3(3n) = 0 for some n ≥ 2, then σ3(3n − 3) = 1
and the previous analysis holds.
Thus, there are two pure subgame-perfect 0-equilibria: (a) at odd stages
the active player stops, and at even stages the active player continues, and
(b) at even stages the active player stops, and at odd stages the active player
continues.
Remark 4 This game admits other subgame-perfect equilibria. In partic-
ular, the proﬁle in which each player stops with probability 1/2 whenever
active, is a subgame-perfect equilibrium. In a sense, it corresponds to the
0-equilibria constructed by Flesch et al. (1997).
In the next example, we allow for probabilities of success below one.
Example 2: Consider the following modiﬁcation of Example 1, where





(1,1,(1,0,3)) n = 1 modulo 3,
(2,1/2,(3,1,0)) n = 2 modulo 3,
(3,1/2,(0,3,1)) n = 0 modulo 3.
Thus, when player 1 stops the game terminates with probability 1, while
when either player 2 or player 3 stops the game terminates with probability
1/2.
As we did in Example 1, we characterize the set of subgame-perfect 0-
equilibrium in pure strategies. Let σ be such a strategy proﬁle. Let n > 0
and i be the active player at stage n. By the subgame-perfect equilibrium
condition, σi(n) = 1 if γi
n+1(σ) < 1 and σi(n) = 0 if γi
n+1(σ) > 1.
Let n ≥ 3, and assume that σ1(3n + 1) = 1. Then γ3n+1(σ) = (1,0,3),
and therefore σ3(3n) = 0. This implies that γ3n(σ) = γ3n+1(σ) = (1,0,3),





























































































and therefore σ2(3n − 10) = 0, and σ1(3n − 11) = 1.
Therefore, any pure subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium must repeat the se-
quence (starting with player 1) (1,0,1;0,0,1;0,1,0;0,1,0) of mixed moves. Along
this cycle, player 1 ﬁrst stops, then player 3 stops twice in a row, then player 2
stops twice in a row. This diﬀerence with the subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium
of Example 1 arises since the probability of termination is here below one. By
decreasing further the probabilities pn (but keeping pn = 1 for n = 1 mod 3),
one can create examples in which all pure subgame-perfect equilibria have
cycles of arbitrary length.
We next introduce a two-player game that has no subgame-perfect 0-
equilibrium and no pure subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium.
Example 3: Take I = {1,2}, and
(in,pn,rn) =
(
(1,1,(−1,2)) n is odd,
(2,1,(−2,1)) n is even.
Fix ε ∈ (0,1), and let σ be the strategy proﬁle deﬁned by σ1(2n+1) = 1
and σ2(2n + 2) = ε for every n ≥ 0. We claim that σ is a subgame-perfect
ε-equilibrium. One should verify that player 1 (resp. player 2) cannot proﬁt
8by deviating in the subgames that start at odd (resp. even) stages. Consider
ﬁrst the subgame that starts at stage 2n + 1, for some n ≥ 0. By stopping
at stage 2n + 1 player 1 receives −1, while, since player 2 eventually stops
with probability 1, player 1’s payoﬀ is at most −1, whatever he plays. In
the subgame starting at stage 2n + 2, player 2’s expected payoﬀ under σ is
ε + 2(1 − ε) = 2 − ε, whereas the maximal payoﬀ to player 2 in the game is
2.
We next prove that the game has no subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in
pure strategies. Assume to the contrary that there exists such a proﬁle σ.
We ﬁrst claim that there is an inﬁnite set of even stages in which player
2 chooses to stop. Otherwise, let N be the maximal integer such that player
2 stops at stage 2N (set N = 0 if player 2 never stops). Consider now
the subgame that starts at stage 2N + 2. Since σ is a subgame-perfect ε-
equilibrium, this implies that under σ player 1 never stops in this subgame:
by never stopping he receives 0, while by stopping he receives −1. But this
implies that under σ player 2 stops in this subgame: by never stopping he
receives 0, while by stopping he receives 1. This, however, contradicts the
deﬁnition of N.
We next claim that there is at most one even stage in which player 2
chooses to stop. Together with the previous paragraph, this shows that there
cannot be a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium. By the preceding paragraph,
there is an inﬁnite sequence of even stages in which player 2 stops. Assume
that player 2 stops at stage 2N, with N > 1. Since σ induces an ε-equilibrium
in the subgame that starts at stage 2N −1, and since player 2 stops at stage
2N, under σ player 1 stops at stage 2N − 1. However, since player 1 stops
at stage 2N − 1, under σ player 2 continues in all stages 2k for k < N: by
continuing in all these stages he receives 2, while his payoﬀ upon stopping is
1.
This example shows that pure subgame-perfect ε-equilibria need not exist.
Such a case may arise when there is a player i who by stopping gives everyone
else high payoﬀ, but he himself receives low payoﬀ. It is then in the interest
of his opponents to threaten him that if he does not stop, one of them will
eventually stop and punish player i. The punisher, however, stops with low
probability, so that player i has a chance to correct his behavior and stop
the game in a later stage.
We ﬁnally prove that there is no subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium. We
9argue by contradiction, and we let σ be a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium. For
i = 1,2, we denote by ci the strategy that always continues, i.e., ci(n) = 0
for each n ∈ Ni. Note ﬁrst that, for each n ∈ N, one has
Pσ(θ < +∞ | θ ≥ n) = 1. (1)
Indeed, the sequence (Pσ(θ < +∞ | θ ≥ n))n∈N would otherwise decrease
to zero, hence the sequence (γn(σ))n∈N would converge to zero, and player 2
would have a proﬁtable deviation in the subgame starting at stage n, for n
large enough. By (1) the game terminates with probability 1, hence at least
one of the players eventually stops with probability 1:
Pσ1,c2(θ < +∞ | θ ≥ n) = 1 for each n ∈ N, or (2)
Pc1,σ2(θ < +∞ | θ ≥ n) = 1 for each n ∈ N. (3)
If (2) holds, then c2 is the best reply to σ1 in all subgames, hence σ2 = c2.
Since the unique best reply of player 1 to c2 is c1, one gets σ = (c1,c2) - a
contradiction to (1).
If (3) holds, there are inﬁnitely many even integers n such that σ2(n) > 0.
By optimality of σ1, and since (3) holds, one has σ1(n − 1) = 1 for any such
n. Therefore, (2) holds - a contradiction.
4 The Proof of Theorem 3
In the present section we prove Theorem 3.
4.1 Preliminaries
In this subsection, we analyze few degenerate cases, and slightly rephrase the
problem. The core of the proof of Theorem 3 is in subsection 4.3.
Let Γ = (I,(in,pn,rn)n∈N) be a game. Since the sequence (rn)n∈N is
bounded, we can assume w.l.o.g. that payoﬀs are bounded by 1.
Let ˜ Γ = (I,(in,pn, ˜ rn)n∈N) be another game with the same sequence
of active players and the same probabilities of success. Since the payoﬀ
functions of the two games diﬀer by at most supn∈N krn−˜ rnk, any subgame-
perfect ε-equilibrium of ˜ Γ is a subgame perfect ε0-equilibrium of Γ, where
ε0 = ε + supn∈N krn − ˜ rnk.
10Since we are looking for an ε-equilibrium, there is no loss of generality in
assuming that the range of the sequence (rn)n∈N is ﬁnite, and that if (i,r)
and (j, ˜ r) are two distinct elements in that range then rk 6= ˜ rk for every k ∈ I.
Notice now that Theorem 3 will follow if we prove that there is a subgame-
perfect ε-equilibrium in some subgame of Γ. Indeed, the conclusion for Γ
will then follow by applying backward induction to the ﬁrst stages of the
game. Moreover, since ﬁnite extensive games with perfect information have
pure subgame-perfect equilibria, the resulting proﬁle will be pure when the
subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium of the subgame is pure.




{pn | n ∈ N,(in,rn) = (i,r)}
and set IR0 = {(i,r) ∈ IR | π(i,r) = +∞}. If π(i,r) = +∞ then if player
i stops whenever (in,rn) = (i,r), and all players continue in all other stages,
the game will eventually terminate, and the terminal payoﬀ will be r.
We now prove that we may assume w.l.o.g. that
π(i,r) = 0 for each (i,r) / ∈ IR0. (4)
To see this, choose ﬁrst N ∈ N large enough such that
X
n≥N:(in,rn)=(i,r)
pn < ε/|IR| for each (i,r) / ∈ IR0 (5)
and denote by ΓN the subgame that starts at stage N. Let ˜ Γ = (I,(in, ˜ pn,rn)n∈N)
be the game that coincides with ΓN except that ˜ pn = 0 whenever (˜ in, ˜ rn) / ∈
IR0.
By (5), the payoﬀ functions of the two games ΓN and ˜ Γ diﬀer by at most
ε. Therefore, any subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium of ˜ Γ is a subgame-perfect
2ε-equilibrium of ΓN, and, by backward induction, yields a subgame-perfect
2ε-equilibrium of Γ.
By construction, the game ˜ Γ satisﬁes (4). Therefore our claims holds.
Thus, we are led to analyze games such that, for each (i,r) ∈ IR, either
π(i,r) = 0 or π(i,r) = +∞ holds. If π(i,r) = 0 for each (i,r) ∈ IR, the
payoﬀ function of the game is identically zero and the conclusion of Theorem
3 follows trivially. Assume now that π(i,r) = +∞ for some (i,r) ∈ IR.
Consider the game obtained by dropping all stages n such that π(in,rn) = 0
11(and by relabeling stages). Since there are inﬁnitely many stages n such that
π(in,rn) = +∞, the resulting game is again a multi-player deterministic
Dynkin game. Plainly, any subgame perfect ε-equilibrium of this new game
is also a subgame perfect ε-equilibrium of the initial game (with the proper
identiﬁcation of stages, and with an arbitrary behavior in the stages that
have been dropped).
To conclude, we can therefore assume w.l.o.g. that π(i,r) = +∞ for each
(i,r) ∈ IR.
4.2 A simple case
Under the assumption that π(i,r) = +∞ for each (i,r) ∈ IR, the proof
proceeds by induction over the number of elements in IR. The conclusion is
easy if |IR| = 1, and is left to the reader.
We now analyze a somewhat degenerate case that generalizes Example 2.
This is the only place in the proof where we use the induction hypothesis.
Lemma 5 Assume that there exists (i,r) ∈ IR such that
r
j ≥ ˜ r
j for every (j, ˜ r) ∈ IR.
Then, for each ε > 0, there is a subgame-perfect -equilibrium.
The lemma states that if there is a terminal payoﬀ r that is preferred by
each player i to all terminal payoﬀs i controls, then a subgame-perfect ε-
equilibrium exists.
Proof. We split the discussion into three cases.
Case 1: ri ≥ 0.
Let σ be the pure strategy proﬁle in which player i stops whenever (in,rn) =
(i,r), and all players continue in all other stages, i.e.,
σ
in(n) = 1 if and only if (in,rn) = (i,r).
Fix n ∈ N. We prove that σ induces a 0-equilibrium in the subgame
that starts at stage n. Since π(i,r) = +∞, the game eventually terminates,
and therefore the expected payoﬀ is r. Player i cannot gain by deviating,
since his payoﬀ is at most ri if he terminates the game, and 0 ≤ ri if he
12always continues. Every player j 6= i cannot gain by deviating either, since
his payoﬀ under σ is rj, while if he deviates his payoﬀ is in the convex hull
of rj and {˜ rj,(j, ˜ r) ∈ IR}, hence at most rj.
Case 2: ri < 0, and there is (j, ˜ r) ∈ IR such that i 6= j and ˜ ri < ri.
Let (nk)k∈N be an increasing sequence of integers such that (in,rn) = (i,r)
for n = nk,k ∈ N. For k ∈ N, set mk = inf{n ≥ nk : (in,rn) = (j, ˜ r)}.
(The sequence (mk)k∈N is non-decreasing but need not be increasing.) Since
π(i,r) = π(j, ˜ r) = +∞, these two sequences are inﬁnite.
Let σ be the strategy proﬁle in which player i stops at all stages nk, player







1 if n = nk,k ∈ N,
ε if n = mk,k ∈ N,
0 otherwise.
The proﬁle σ is a subgame-perfect 2ε-equilibrium. Indeed, consider the
subgame that starts at stage n. By the choice of the sequence (mk)k∈N, one
has kγn(σ) − rk ≤ 2ε: γn(σ) is equal to r if n > mk0 where k0 = inf{k :
nk ≥ n}, and is equal to ε˜ r + (1 − ε)r otherwise. Notice that, under any
unilateral deviation, the game terminates with probability one. Therefore,
for each player l and each strategy τl ∈ Σl, the payoﬀ γl
n(τl,σ−l) to player l by
deviating from σl to τl is in the convex hull of the set {rl, ˜ rl}∪{ˆ rl,(l, ˆ r) ∈ IR},
hence is at most rl.
Case 3: ri < 0, and ˜ ri ≥ ri for every (j, ˜ r) ∈ IR with i 6= j.
Consider the modiﬁed game where one sets pn = 0 whenever (in,rn) =
(i,r), or, alternatively, one drops all stages in which (in,rn) = (i,r).
By the induction hypothesis, this game admits a subgame-perfect ε-
equilibrium σ0. Extend σ0 to a proﬁle σ in the original game, by instructing
player i to continue at all stages n such that (in,rn) = (i,r).
It is easy to see that σ is a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium. Indeed, for ev-
ery player j 6= i, any deviation in the original game yields the same expected
payoﬀ the deviation yields in the modiﬁed game. Since σ0 is a subgame-
perfect ε-equilibrium, no player j 6= i can proﬁt more than ε by deviating in
the original game.
Moreover, under σ0 the expected payoﬀ to player i is at least min{0,min(j,˜ r),j6=i ˜ ri} ≥
ri. Therefore, if player i deviates at stages n such that (in,rn) = (i,r) he
13cannot proﬁt, while if he deviates in other stages, he cannot proﬁt more than
ε, since σ0 is a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium.
4.3 The general case
In view of Lemma 5, Theorem 3 will follow from Proposition 6 below.
Proposition 6 Let Γ be a deterministic multi-player Dynkin game. Assume
that for every (i,r) ∈ IR, (i) π(i,r) = +∞, and (ii) there is (j, ˜ r) ∈ IR such
that ˜ rj > rj. Then, for every ε > 0, the game Γ has a subgame-perfect
ε-equilibrium in pure Markovian strategies.
We do not know whether a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium exists or not.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of the proposition.
As remarked at the beginning of Section 4.1, we can assume w.l.o.g. that
for every (i,r),(j, ˜ r) ∈ IR, either (i,r) = (j, ˜ r), or rk 6= ˜ rk for every k.
For every i ∈ I set
m
i = max{r
i | (i,r) ∈ IR}.
This is the maximal terminal payoﬀ player i can receive when he alone stops.
Let ρi ∈ RI be the unique vector r such that (i,r) ∈ IR and ri = mi
(uniqueness is guaranteed by the preceding paragraph).
Finally, set
W = {w ∈ R
N | w
i ≤ m
i for some i ∈ I}.
This is the set of all payoﬀ vectors w such that at least one player is better
oﬀ by stopping at some stage rather than continuing forever and receiving
w.
An important property of the set W is that if the continuation payoﬀ
at stage n is w ∈ W, and if player in prefers to stop rather than continue
(that is, win ≤ rin
n ), then the expected payoﬀ if player in stops at stage n,
(1 − pn)w + pnrn, is in W. Formally,
w ∈ W and w
in ≤ r
in
n implies (1 − pn)w + pnrn ∈ W, for every n ∈ N. (6)
Indeed, under the assumptions, (1 − pn)win + pnrin
n ≤ rin
n ≤ min, and (6)
follows.
14Let ε > 0 be given. We will prove the existence of a subgame perfect
ε-equilibrium. We assume that ε < 1
2 min(i,r)6=(j,˜ r) |ri − ˜ ri|. We also assume
that ε is small enough so that, for every N ∈ N and every ﬁnite sequence




Xn = 1) < ε/2 ⇒
N X
n=1
pn < ε (7)
(see Rosenberg et al. (2002, Lemma 18) for a stronger statement).
We partition the set N of stages into inﬁnitely many ﬁnite blocks. Set
n0 = 1 and, for l ∈ N, deﬁne the initial stage nl of block l to be
nl = min{n > nl−1 |
X
nl≤k<n,(ik,rk)=(i,r)
pk ≥  ∀(i,r) ∈ IR}.
Hence, in each block, all players have a probability at least  to terminate the
game with any vector they choose. Since π(i,r) = +∞ for each (i,r) ∈ IR,
all nl, l ∈ N, are ﬁnite.
Let l > 0 be given. We will deﬁne a pure proﬁle σ = σl up to stage nl.
Later we will let l vary. As for now, we omit the dependency of σl on l.
We will simultaneously construct a sequence (w(n))
nl
n=1 of vectors in W. As
a ﬁrst approximation, the vector w(n) may be interpreted as the expected
payoﬀ under σ from stage n onwards.
We deﬁne both σ and w backwards. We let w(nl) be an arbitrary point
in W ∩ [−1,1]I. We deal with each of the blocks inductively (starting with
the lth one). Let k ≤ l. Assuming w(nk) ∈ W is already deﬁned, we deﬁne
now σ and w over the stages n = nk−1,...,nk − 1.
Given w(n+1) and σin(n), we set w(n) = σin(n)pnrn+(1−σin(n)pn)w(n+
1), so that we need only deﬁne σin(n). Thus, if w(n+1) is the expected payoﬀ
from stage n + 1 onward, w(n) is the expected payoﬀ from stage n onward.
Since w(nl) ∈ W and by (6), w(n) ∈ W for every n ≤ nl.
Case 1 wi(nk) ≤ mi −  for some i ∈ I.
We deﬁne σ by backward induction, with an appropriate tie-breaking
rule. Set σin(n) = 1 if rin
n ≥ win(n + 1), and σ
in
l (n) = 0 otherwise.
Thus, at stage n, player in compares his continuation payoﬀ win(n+1) to
the payoﬀ rin
n he would get by stopping, and he continues or stops accordingly.
15Case 2 wi(nk) ≥ mi −  for each i ∈ I.
Since w(nk) ∈ W, there is a player i∗ ∈ I such that w
i∗
l (nk) ≤ mi∗. At the
ﬁnal stages of the block only player i∗ will possibly stop. In earlier stages, σ
will be deﬁned using backward induction as in Case 1.
Formally, let nk−1 ≤ n < nk. Assume that σ has been deﬁned for stages
q = n+1,...,nk−1. We deﬁne σ at stage n as follows. Denote by π(n+1,nk)
the probability under σ that, starting from stage n+1, the game terminates
under σ before stage nk, i.e.,
π(nk,nk) = 0, and π(q,nk) = σ
iq(q)pq+(1−σ
iq(q))π(q+1,nk) for n+1 ≤ q < nk.
Then:
• if π(n + 1,nk) < ε, we set σin(n) = 1 if both in = i∗ and ri∗
n ≥ wi∗(n)
hold. We set σin(n) = 0 otherwise;
• if π(n + 1,nk) ≥ ε, we set σin(n) = 1 if rin
n ≥ w
in
l (n), and σin(n) = 0
otherwise.
We now prove that under σ, the probability of termination in any single
block is bounded away from zero.
Lemma 7 For each k such that 0 ≤ k < l, one has
Pσ(θ < nk+1 | θ ≥ nk) ≥ ε/3.
Proof. We consider Cases 1 and 2 in turn. In both cases, we will prove
that π(nk,nk+1) ≥ ε/3.
We ﬁrst assume that Case 1 holds, and we let i∗ ∈ I be a player such
that wi(nk) ≤ mi − .
1. If σi∗(n) = 1 whenever (in,rn) = (i∗,ρi∗), one has π(nk,nk+1) ≥ ε/2,
using (7) and since
P
n:nk≤n<nk+1,(in,rn)=(i∗,ρi∗) pn ≥ ε.
2. If σi∗(n) = 0 for some n such that (in,rn) = (i∗,ρi∗), then wi∗(n+1) >
mi∗. Observe now that, since payoﬀs are bounded by one, one has
w
i∗(n + 1) ≤ π(n + 1,nk+1) + (1 − π(n + 1,nk+1))w
i∗(nk+1).
This yields
π(n + 1,nk+1) ≥
ε
1 − mi∗ + ε
≥ ε/3.
Since π(nk,nk+1) ≥ π(n + 1,nk+1), the conclusion also follows in that
case.
16We next assume that Case 2 holds and we let i∗ ∈ I be the player distin-
guished in the deﬁnition of σ.
1. If σj(n) = 1 for some n and some player j 6= i∗, then as in item 2 above
π(n + 1,nk+1) ≥ ε/2, hence π(nk,nk+1) ≥ ε/2.
2. If σj(n) = 0 for each player j 6= i∗ and each stage n with in = j, then
wi∗(n) ≤ mi∗ for each n. Indeed, only player i∗ stops, and his payoﬀ
is the average of wi∗(nk+1) ≤ mi∗ and ρ
i∗
i∗ ≤ mi∗. Therefore σi∗(n) = 1
whenever (in,rn) = (i∗,ρi∗), and one gets π(nk,nk+1) ≥ ε/2, as in item
1 above.
We will now let l vary and we denote by σl and wl the objects that were
deﬁned above. The pure strategy proﬁle σl may be identiﬁed with a point
in {0,1}N (the nth component being the behavior at stage n of the active
player in). Since the product space {0,1}N is compact (and metrizable),
the sequence (σl)l≥0 has a subsequence that converges to some pure strategy
proﬁle σ∗. For notational convenience, we still denote this subsequence by
(σl)l≥0. Note that, for each n ∈ N, the ﬁrst n components of σ∗ coincide with
the ﬁrst n components of σl, provided l is suﬃciently large. For such l’s, the
behavior in the ﬁrst n stages of the game under the two strategy proﬁles σ∗
and σl coincide.
Our goal is to prove that σ∗ is a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium. We ﬁrst
prove that the play terminates Pσ∗-a.s. in each subgame. We will then relate
the payoﬀ γ(σ∗) to the sequence (wl)l∈N (Lemma 9) and prove that no player
has a proﬁtable one-stage deviation (Lemma 10) under σ∗. The conclusion
follows (Proposition 12), after we prove that no single player is responsible
for the termination of the game (Lemma 11).
Corollary 8 For each k ∈ N, one has
Pσ∗(θ < nk+1 | θ ≥ nk) ≥ ε/3.
Proof. Let l ∈ N be large enough so that l > k and σ∗ coincides with σl
up to stage nk+1, and apply Lemma 7.




17Proof. We prove the result for n = 1. The proof is similar for the
subgame that starts at stage n ∈ N.
Let k ∈ N be given. For each l ∈ N, one has
γ(σ∗) = Eσ∗[rθ1θ<nk] + Pσ∗(θ ≥ nk)γnk(σ∗), and
wl(1) = Eσl[rθ1θ<nk] + Pσl(θ ≥ nk)wl(nk).
For l large enough, the two proﬁles σl and σ∗ coincide up to stage nk.
Hence, using Lemma 7 and Corollary 8, one gets, for l large enough,






The next lemma says in substance that no player can increase his payoﬀ
by more than 3ε by modifying his strategy in a single stage.
Lemma 10 Let n ∈ N be given. The following implications hold.
• If σin









Proof. Let n ∈ N be given. Let l ∈ N be suﬃciently large so that nl > n.
We ﬁrst prove a related statement for the strategy proﬁle σl. Let k < l be
determined by nk ≤ n < nk+1.
By construction, σ
in
l (n) is deﬁned using backward induction, except in
some case where σ
in
l (n) is required to be zero. In the former case, one has
σ
in
l (n) = 1 if rin
n ≥ w
in
l (n + 1) and σ
in
l (n) = 0 otherwise. In the latter
case, one has w
in





l (n+1) |< 2ε, which yields w
in
l (n+1) ≥ min −3ε ≥ rin
n −3ε.
Hence, in both cases, one has
w
in
l (n + 1) ≤ rin
n if σ
in
l (n) = 1, and
w
in
l (n + 1) ≥ rin
n − 3ε if σ
in
l (n) = 0.
The conclusion follows by taking the limit l → +∞.
We now prove that the play terminates a.s., even if a single player chooses
to continue whenever active.
18Lemma 11 For every i ∈ I and every n ∈ N, one has
Pci,σ−i
∗ (θ < +∞ | θ ≥ n) = 1.
Proof. We argue by contradiction, and we assume that, for some player
i ∈ I, the sequence Pci,σ−i
∗ (θ < +∞ | θ ≥ n) converges to zero when n goes
to +∞. By Corollary 8 the game eventually terminates, so that Pσ∗(θ <
+∞ | θ ≥ n) = 1 for every n. Therefore, it must be the case that player
i terminates the game: Pσi
∗,c−i(θ < +∞ | θ ≥ n) = 1 for every n, and
limn→+∞ kγn(σ∗) − γn(σi
∗,c−i)k = 0.
We ﬁrst prove that limn→+∞ γn(σ∗) = ρi, and then deduce a contradiction
with the basic assumption made on Γ.
Step 1 : the sequence (γi
n(σ∗))n∈N is convergent.
Let n ∈ N be arbitrary. If n ∈ Ni then Lemma 10 implies that γi
n(σ∗) ≥
γi















∗ (n) = 0.











Let ˜ ε > 0 be given. Assume that ˜ ε is small enough so that (7) holds w.r.t.
˜ ε, and choose N˜ ε ∈ N suﬃciently large so that Pci,σ−i
∗ (θ < +∞ | θ ≥ N˜ ε) <
˜ ε/2. For such N˜ ε,
P
N˜ ε≤q<+∞;q/ ∈Ni pq1σ
iq





n(σ∗) − 2˜ ε, for every n ≥ m ≥ N˜ ε.
This implies the convergence of (γi
n(σ∗))n∈N, since it is a bounded sequence.
Step 2 : limn→+∞ γn(σ∗) = ρi.
Let λ := limn→+∞ γi
n(σ∗) be the limit of the payoﬀs to player i in the
successive subgames. We prove ﬁrst that λ = mi. Let N ∈ N be such that
|γn(σ∗) − λ| < ε/2 for each n ≥ N. In particular, C1 or C2 below holds:
C1. γn(σ∗) > mi − ε for every n ≥ N;
19C2. γn(σ∗) ≤ mi − ε/2 for every n ≥ N.
Assume ﬁrst that C1 holds. By the choice of ε, one has ri
n < γi
n+1(σ∗)
whenever n ≥ N, in = i and rn 6= ρi. By Lemma 10, σi
∗(n) = 0 for each such
stage. In other words, from stage N, player i chooses to stop only in those
stages such that rn = ρi. Since Pσi
∗,c−i(θ < +∞ | θ ≥ n) = 1 for each n, one
therefore has γi
n(σi
∗,c−i) = mi, for each n ≥ N, which implies λ = mi.
Assume next that C2 holds. We argue by contradiction and assume that
λ 6= mi. Since λ = limn→+∞ γi
n(σi
∗,c−i), one has λ < mi.
By Lemma 10, one has σi
∗(n) = 1 for each n ≥ N such that (in,rn) =


























a contradiction, since the second summation converges to +∞ when n goes
to +∞ while all other terms are bounded.
Hence, limn→+∞ γi




∗,c−i) = ρi since ρi ∈ RI is the unique vector such that
(i,r) ∈ IR and ri = mi. Finally, this implies limn→+∞ γn(σ) = ρi.
Step 3 : The contradiction




+∞ | θ ≥ m) < 1 for some m ∈ N, and since π(j, ˜ r) = +∞, there
are inﬁnitely many stages n such that (in,rn) = (j, ˜ r) and σj
∗(n) = 0.





n(σ∗) ≥ ˜ rj. Since ˜ rj > ρ
j
i = limn→+∞ γj
n(σ∗), we get a contra-
diction.
Proposition 12 σ∗ is a subgame-perfect 3ε-equilibrium.
Proof. Let i ∈ I be given. We prove that player i cannot gain more than
3ε by deviating from σ∗. The same proof will hold in any subgame, thereby
showing the subgame-perfectness property.
Deﬁne the sequence (Xn)ninN of random variables by Xn = ri
θ if θ < n
and Xn = γi
n(σ∗) if θ ≥ n. Let τi be an arbitrary strategy of player i. By
20Lemma 11, the sequence (Xn)ninN converges Pτi,σ−i




∗ [Xn] = Eτi,σ−i





On the other hand, by Lemma 10, one has Eτi,σ−i
∗ [Xn+1|Hn] ≤ Xn +
3ε1θ=n, where Hn is the past play up to stage n. By taking expectations,
and by summation over n, one obtains limn→+∞ Eτi,σ−i






∗ ) ≤ γ
i(σ∗) + 3ε.
5 Discussion
A natural extension of the model is to drop the assumption that the order
of the players is deterministic. That is, to assume that (in,pn,rn)n∈N is
a (non-deterministic) process. Whether or not there is a subgame-perfect
ε-equilibrium in this model is still unknown.
When |I| = 2, one can generalize the result of Shmaya and Solan (2002)
to show that an ε-equilibrium exists. However, it is not known whether pure
subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium proﬁles in Markovian strategies exist.
One can even restrict oneself to the following simple class of games. Let
I be a ﬁnite set of players, and, for each i ∈ I, ﬁx ri ∈ RI. At every stage,
independent of past play, a player i ∈ I is chosen at random, each player is
chosen with probability 1/|I|. Player i then has to decide whether he stops
or continues. If he continues, the game continues to the next stage, while if
he stops, the game terminates with probability 1, and the terminal payoﬀ is
given by ri.
Whether or not any such game admits a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium
in Markovian strategies is an open problem, which seems to have signiﬁcant
implications on the study of equilibrium payoﬀ in stochastic games.
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